Recently there has been much interest in quantifying the robustness of neural network classifiers through adversarial risk metrics. However, for problems where test-time corruptions occur in a probabilistic manner, rather than being generated by an explicit adversary, adversarial metrics typically do not provide an accurate or reliable indicator of robustness.
INTRODUCTION
Since the discovery of the phenomenon of adversarial examples for neural networks (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Papernot et al., 2016) , a variety of approaches for assessing and mitigating their practical impact on decision-making systems have been proposed (Gu and Rigazio, 2015; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; . Much of this work has focused on the formal verification of properties of neural network classifiers, such as the robustness of individual decisions under an L p -norm perturbation set (Majumdar and Kuncak, 2017; Gehr et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2018) , typically doing this in an input-specific manner.
However, in practice, one is usually concerned with the overall robustness of the network, that is, its robustness across the range of possible inputs that it will see at test-time, something which is typically far more difficult to characterize and calculate. This has motivated network-wide robustness definitions, such as average minimal adversarial definitions (Fawzi et al., 2018) and adversarial risk/accuracy , as well training schemes aiming to produce networks which perform well under these metrics (Wong and Kolter, 2018; .
Motivated by applications in which an explicit adversary is working against the network, these metrics generally focus on worst-case robustness, that is, they are based on the largest loss within the perturbed region. Notwithstanding, there are a variety of reasons why this may not always be preferable behavior.
Firstly, there are many applications where one is concerned about robustness to naturally occurring or random perturbations of the inputs, rather than an explicit test-time adversary. For example, in many safetycritical applications like self-driving cars, we may not have access to the exact inputs due to sensor imperfections and wish to ensure our predictions are robust to such variations. Here our classifier must account for these variations, but some level of risk will usually be acceptable: it will typically be neither feasible nor necessary to guarantee there are no possible adversarial inputs, but we instead wish to evaluate the probability of there being such an input. Secondly, previous work has shown that worse-case robustness metrics can have very poor generalization from train to test time Yin et al., 2019) , both from a theoretical perspective and in practice for real networks, thereby substantially reducing their applicability.
Finally, whereas the motivation for requiring worstcase robustness for individual inputs is often clear, it is more difficult to motivate using worst-case robustness for the classifier as a whole. Specifically, because there will typically be some randomness in the exact inputs observed at test-time, our classifier can only be perfectly worse-case robust if it is robust to all possible arXiv:1912.04884v2 [stat.ML] 11 Dec 2019 perturbations of all possible inputs, something which will very rarely be achievable for practical problems.
To address these issues, we build on the statistical robustness work of Webb et al. (2019) , which quantifies the expected robustness of an individual decision under an input perturbation distribution, to construct a framework for characterizing the overall robustness of a network in a statistical manner. Specifically, we introduce the notion of a statistically robust risk (SRR), a class of metrics that can be used to assess the overall robustness of a neural network classifier by averaging a loss function over both possible inputs and an input perturbation distribution.
Unlike worst-case robustness approaches, our SRR framework naturally applies at a network-wide level due to the law of total expectation. We demonstrate that the SRR can differ significantly from both the corresponding natural (i.e., non-robust) and adversarial (i.e., worst-case) risks, and as such provides a unique metric for both training and testing networks that helps ensure robustness to probabilistic input perturbations. We provide theoretical and empirical evidence that the SRR has superior generalization performance to the corresponding adversarial risk, particularly in highdimensions, with bounds on the generalization error respectively scaling as O(log(d)) and O( √ d) in the size of the network. This suggests that it may be possible to obtain statistically robust networks in a wide range of applications where adversarial robustness is still elusive or inappropriate.
BACKGROUND

Adversarial Examples
Although the general concept of adversarial examples (a perturbed input data point that is classified poorly) is well understood, the precise definition is often left implicit in literature, despite many versions being present. To formalize this, let f θ represent the classifier (with parameters θ) and c a hypothetical ground-truth "reference" classifier. Let x be the original input point and x the perturbed input point. Then at least 3 different definitions are commonly used (Diochnos et al., 2018) :
For pointwise robustness metrics (Szegedy et al., 2014; Webb et al., 2019) , we are usually concerned with cases where the original point was classified correctly and so the PC and CI definitions coincide. However, the distinction is important when we are working with overall metrics over multiple data points (some of which will be incorrectly classified). Unless otherwise explicitly stated, we will take the CI definition in this paper.
Adversarial Risk
The risk of a classifier f θ is a measure of its average performance with respect to the data distribution:
where (X, Y ) is an input/target pair, p D is the true data generating distribution, and L is some loss function. For non-robust risks, L(X, Y, f θ ) can usually be written in the form φ(f θ (X), Y ), which we term the natural risk. For example, the 0-1 and cross-entropy losses:
To model the effect of an adversary limited to additively perturbing inputs by a vector δ within a limited set ∆ (e.g., an L ∞ -ball), adversarial risk is defined as r
which is in fact a form of risk with loss function L adv = max δ∈∆ φ(f θ (X +δ), Y ). When the 0-1 loss φ 01 function is used, this is known as adversarial accuracy.
Empirical versions R(f θ ) and R adv (f θ ) of both definitions can be obtained by replacing the expectation over p D with a Monte Carlo average over a training dataset {(x 1 , y 1 ), ..., (x N , y N )}. The standard training of a classifier then corresponds to solving the optimization problem min θ R(f θ ). For adversarial risks, this corresponds to a class of well-known minimax problems called robust optimization (Ben-Tal et al., 2009) .
Methods for solving this optimization problem typically include a subroutine for approximating the inner maximization before performing training on the neural network parameters θ. Adversarial training (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Kurakin et al., 2018; , provides a lower bound on the inner maximization by using gradient-based methods to generate maximally adversarial examples. Other methods, instead, upper bound the inner maximization by approximating the neural network using convex relaxations before performing the outer minimization on that structure (Wong and Kolter, 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018) . Webb et al. (2019) recently introduced a statistical robustness metric that provides a statistical alternative to formal verification of neural network properties. They model inputs using an input distribution, p(·), and define their metric to be the probability of violation under this. This provides more information than standard verification about the network's robustness: if the property is not violated, then the probability is 0, whereas if there exists a violation, the metric indicates how likely the event of violation is.
Statistical Robustness
Formally, they define their robustness metric using:
• A property function s(x ; f θ , ψ) defined over the input space x ∈ X , where f θ is the neural network and ψ is problem specific parameters (e.g. the true label). This is designed such that the event E = {s(x ; f θ , ψ) ≥ 0} represents a violation of the property, which could, for example, represent the misclassification of the target.
• An input distribution p(x ), typically taking the form of a perturbation distribution p(x |x).
Their statistical robustness metric is then given by the integral (suppressing f θ and ψ from s)
An important application of this method is to pointwise robustness for neural network classifiers. Standard verification schemes target the binary 0-1 metric on whether an adversarial example exists in a perturbation region ∆ around a point. On the other hand, the statistical robustness metric can determine the probability of drawing an adversarial example from some perturbation distribution.
Because E often constitutes a (potentially very) rare event, numerically calculating (5) can be challenging. To address this, Webb et al. (2019) further introduce an estimation approach based around adaptive multilevel splitting (AMLS) (Guyader et al., 2011) and show that this can effectively estimate I[p, s] even for large networks and high-dimensional input spaces.
STATISTICALLY ROBUST METRICS
Despite the statistical robustness framework introduced in the last section having numerous attractive properties for quantifying neural network robustness, Webb et al. (2019) only consider using it for assessing pointwise robustness. We now show how it can be straightforwardly extended to characterize the robustness of a whole network, and, in turn, how this can be adapted to a notion of statistically robust risk, which, unlike the approach of Webb et al. (2019) , is suitable for network training as well as evaluating existing networks.
The Total Statistical Robustness Metric
The statistical robustness metric can be straightforwardly extended to a metric for the whole network by simply averaging the pointwise metric over the data generating distribution. This allows us to define the total statistical robustness metric (TSRM) as
where p D is the true data generating distribution and p(·|X) is the perturbation distribution around a point X (which will typically be additive, i.e. p(X + δ | X) = p(δ)). Intuitively, I total can be thought of as the probability that the property will be violated for an arbitrary input point and perturbation at test time, e.g. the probability the target will be misclassified.
Given the sophisticated Monte Carlo machinery required to accurately estimate the statistical robustness metric, it may at first seem like I total will be impractically difficult to estimate. Indeed, if one were to draw data points at random and separately run the estimation approach of Webb et al. (2019) this would indeed be the case. However, there are two key factors, which mean that this can be avoided. Firstly, the law of total expectation means we can treat (6) as a single expec-
Secondly, I total is typically dominated by a small subset of the inputs for which the pointwise statistical robustness is large. For these points, E is typically not an especially rare event and can thus be estimated efficiently by simple Monte Carlo, thereby requiring substantially less computational effort. 1 Therefore, surprisingly, I total can typically be accurately estimated with comparable, and often noticeably less, computation than a single instance of the pointwise metric.
Statistically Robust Risk
The TSRM forms a useful metric for already trained networks, yet it is not suitable as an objective for training due to the difficulty of taking gradients through the identity function. Furthermore, it only applies to cases where we wish to estimate a probability of failure, rather than a more general loss.
To address these issues, we note that the TSRM can be thought of as a specific risk and thus generalized to
where φ represents a natural, pointwise, loss function as per Section 2.2. 2 We refer to r stat (p, f θ ) as the statistically robust risk (SRR). The link to the TSRM is straightforward, with TSRM constituting the special
. Note that the SRR corresponds to using the loss function
Critically, the SRR allows us to use differentiable losses, φ, such that it can form an objective for robust neural network training using stochastic gradient descent. Namely, by exploiting the law of total expectation, we can draw data points from the training data, (X n , Y n ) ∼ p D (·, ·), draw corresponding sample perturbations X n ∼ p(· | X = X n ), and then update the network using the unbiased gradient updates
noting that this is equivalent to conventional training but with the inputs randomly perturbed.
The SRR further provides a mechanism for linking statistical robustness back to the conventional notions of natural and adversarial risk, as well as a basis for theoretical analysis (see Section 4). For example, we see that the natural risk can be viewed as a special case of the SRR for which p(X |X) collapses to a Dirac delta measure about X. On the other hand, in the additive perturbation case, that is p(X |X) = p(δ) where δ = X − X, we see that when the support of p(δ) is contained within the perturbation set ∆, the SRR, r stat , is upper bounded by the adversarial risk, r adv , since
At a high-level, training using the SRR has the effect of "smoothing" the decision boundaries relative to using the corresponding natural risk. This can be useful when we want to be sensitive to certain classes or events, as it allows us to train our classifier to take conservative actions when the input is close to potentially problematic regions. For example, a self-driving car needs to ensure it avoids false negatives when predicting the presence of a pedestrian in its path.
THEORETICAL GENERALIZATION ANALYSIS
Though adversarial training is effective for reducing the adversarial risk of neural networks on MNIST, success has been limited in scaling up to higher-dimensional datasets such as CIFAR-10. show that this is due to a generalization gap, whereby it is possible to achieve an adversarial accuracy of 97% on the training set, yet just 47% on the test set. This overfitting is in contrast to the natural case where welltuned networks of sufficient capacity rarely overfit on CIFAR-10. We explore whether this gap still holds for our total statistical robustness metric through the lens of Rademacher complexity.
Let
It is well known in statistical learning theory that we can probabilistically upper bound the generalization error r D (f ) − R N (f ) of a learning algorithm using notions of complexity on the admissible set of classifiers and loss function (Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David, 2014) . Intuitively, if the admissible set of functions is less complex, then there is less capacity to overfit to the training data.
To be more precise, we define the empirical Rademacher complexity (ERC) for a function class F : R d → R and a sample S = {X 1 , ..., X N } of size N with elements in R d to be (Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David, 2014) :
where σ 1 , ..., σ N are independent Rademacher random variables, which take either the value −1 or +1, each with probability 1 2 . Intuitively, this measures the complexity of the class by determining how many different ways functions f ∈ F can classify the sample S.
Using the ERC and defining the loss function class L
we can now bound the generalization error using the following Theorem from Yin et al. (2019) :
Then for any δ ∈ (0, 1), we have, for all f ∈ F,
where r D (f ) is the risk and
is the empirical risk.
This bound is probabilistic, data-dependent and uniform over all f ∈ F. This means it holds for all f ∈ F, including those trained on the dataset S. To take advantage of it, we need to be able to compute Rad S (L F ). The Rademacher complexity of the set of neural network classifiers Rad S (F) can be upper bounded (Bartlett et al., 2017; Yin et al., 2019) by an expression which is O (log(d max ) ), where d max is the maximal number of nodes in a single layer. Thus we simply need to relate Rad S (L F ) to Rad S (F).
First, let us consider the natural case, for which
is γ−Lipschitz in the first argument, we can use the Talagrand contraction lemma (Ledoux and Talagrand, 2013) , which gives that Rad S (L F ) ≤ γ Rad S (F). Thus, substituting this inequality into (11), we have
such that our generalization error bound scales as O(log(d max )).
We now introduce an analogous result for the SRR.
Theorem 2. For any δ ∈ (0, 1) and all f ∈ F,
where c and γ are equal to their values in the natural risk case. In other words, the generalization error for the SRR is upper bounded by an expression with dependence on log(d max ).
Proof. Firstly, using the law of total expectation, we can rewrite the SRR in the form of a single expectation over (X, Y, X )
Notice that this takes the form of natural risk on an extended space, with a natural loss function φ(f θ (X ), Y ). Since this loss does not depend explicitly on X, we can further rewrite it as and expectation over (X , Y )
where q D ((X , Y )) ∝ X p D (X, Y )p(X |X)dX. This is now precisely in the natural form with q D replacing p D . Moreover, as c and γ depend only on φ, their values are unchanged from the natural case and so we can directly invoke (13).
In contrast, for the adversarial risk (in binary classification), where L adv (X, Y, f ) max δ∈∆ φ(f θ (X + δ), Y ), Rad S (L adv F ) is lower bounded by an expression containing explicit dependence on √ d in , where d in is the dimension of the input layer to the NN (Yin et al., 2019) . While this lower bound does not allow us to directly bound the generalization error using Equation (13), it does suggest that in high dimensions the adversarial generalization error can be much greater than the natural and statistically robust generalization error.
This indicates it will typically be difficult to train networks that are adversarially robust at test time for high-dimensional datasets. On the other hand, our analysis shows that statistically robust networks may be easier to obtain.
RELATED WORK
The concept of training neural networks with randomly perturbed inputs is, of course, not new (Plaut et al., 1986; Elman and Zipser, 1988; Sietsma and Dow, 1991; Holmstrom and Koistinen, 1992; Minnix, 1992; An, 1996) . For example, Elman and Zipser (1988) show how the accuracy of neural networks trained to classify phonemes is improved by perturbing the inputs with uniform noise normalized by the scale of the inputs. They note that training with noise performs a form of data augmentation, smoothing the decision boundaries, and thus improving the model's generalization to new inputs. Webb (1994) and Bishop (1995) , meanwhile, make explicit the connection between training with perturbed inputs and regularization, proving that for the sum-of-squares loss function, training with noise is approximately equal to training with Tikhonov regularization. Other work has investigated training neural networks by perturbing other components of the neural network such as its weights (An, 1996; Jim et al., 1996; Graves et al., 2013) , targets (Szegedy et al., 2016; Vaswani et al., 2017) , and gradients (Neelakantan et al., 2015) , with a similar motivation to input perturbation. Modern widely used techniques such as dropout (Srivastava et al., 2014; Wager et al., 2013) can also be interpreted as regularization by the addition of noise.
Our work differs from these previous approaches in that training with noise emerges from a principled risk minimization framework, rather than being taken as the starting point of algorithmic development with a justification ex post facto. Moreover, we use input perturbations not only during training but also as a means of evaluating the robustness of the classifier at test-time.
We have also drawn novel connections and comparisons between existing adversarial/robustness methods and probabilistic input perturbations, providing conceptual, theoretical, and (later) empirical arguments for why the latter is an important component in the greater arsenal of robust classification approaches. We further highlight that our framework is more general than the simple addition of Gaussian or uniform noise to the inputs of a standard loss function, in that both the per- turbation distribution and loss function can be crafted to incorporate prior knowledge about the task at hand.
EXPERIMENTS
To empirically investigate our SRR framework, we now present a series of experiments comparing it with natural and adversarial approaches. For training using the SRR, we follow the approach from Section 3.2, generating perturbations X n to points X n in the training dataset and then using a mini-batch version of the gradient update in (9).
Unless otherwise stated, we train using the cross entropy loss,
referring to training on the resulting SRR as corruption training. To maintain consistency with natural training settings, we then evaluate using the 0-1 loss function
We refer to the resulting SRR as Accuracy-TSRM (A-TRSM), since this is a version of (6) where the event {s(X ) ≥ 0} corresponds to {arg max i f θ (X ) i = Y }.
Comparison to Natural Accuracy
In this experiment, we show that naturally trained networks are vulnerable under the A-TSRM metric and that corruption training can alleviate this vulnerability. Specifically, we examine the A-TSRM for naturally trained and corruption trained neural network classifiers on MNIST, using corruption models given by the uniform distribution on L ∞ -balls of radius .
We use a dense ReLU network with an input layer of size 784, a hidden layer of size 256, and an output layer of size 10. We train using 5 different methods: natural training (i.e., = 0), and corruption training with = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7. We then evaluate on A-TSRM using a range of values of from 10 −3 (below the level of discretization in the pixel values and thus invisible) to 0.7 (difficult for even humans to classify).
The results, shown in Figure 1 , provide several interesting insights. Most notably, corruption training led to reduced values for the A-TSRM compared to natural training for all values of equal to or larger than the value used in training (with the exception that training with = 0.1 did slightly worse when evaluated with > 0.4). These gains are sometimes more than an order of magnitude in size, confirming that, not only is A-TSRM highly distinct to natural accuracy, but training using an appropriate SRR can provide significant A-TSRM benefits at test-time. Though this comes at the cost of reduced test-time accuracy for this example (as highlighted by evaluations at small values of ), we will later find that this is not always the case.
Empirical Generalization Error
As previously noted, it has proved challenging to train networks to achieve high test-time adversarial accuracy on higher-dimensional datasets such as CIFAR-10 due to poor generalization from training. By contrast, our analysis in Section 4 suggests that the gap will be more similar to natural accuracy for SRR approaches. We thus investigate the generalization gap experimentally for A-TSRM on CIFAR-10. Additionally, we compare corruption training with the PGD adversarial training method of , which is designed to maximize adversarial accuracy.
We use a wide residual network architecture (Zagoruyko and Komodakis, 2016 ) with depth 28, widening factor 10, and dropout rate 0.3. We train using four different methods: natural training, corruption training with = 0.157 and = 0.5, and PGD adversarial training (7 gradient steps) with = 0.157. Correspondingly, we then evaluate these networks using natural accuracy, A-TSRM with = 0.157 and = 0.5, and adversarial accuracy with = 0.157 (computed using 7-step PGD). Here = 0.157 corresponds roughly 8/255 in pixel values, which is used as the corruption set by for adversarial training, while = 0.5 represents a more extreme corruption model.
We report the train/test scores after 30 epochs (averaged over 5 runs) in Table 1 . Though we run each training process with the same number of epochs, adversarial training took significantly longer than natural or corruption training (approx. 6 times).
On all of natural and A-TRSM evaluation metrics and all training methods, we observe a fairly small generalization gap of up to about 8%, which is in line with the natural/natural generalization gap of 5.8%. This compares very favorably to adversarial accuracy, for which we see a much larger gap of 27.2% for the PGD trained network (and where found a 50% generalization gap eventually, running for more epochs on the same architecture). This provides support for our theoretical analysis suggesting that A-TSRM (statistical robustness) generalizes better than adversarial accuracy for higher dimensional datasets.
For the natural and A-TSRM metrics, we also notice that the best test-set performance was achieved using the corresponding natural/corruption training method. The drop in performance from training using larger values of than those used in the evaluation was far less than in the reciprocal case. For example, corruption training with = 0.5 had a test natural accuracy 5% below natural training, but natural training had an A-TSRM 32.3% worse than corruption training.
Interestingly, PGD (with = 0.157) was also found to be fairly effective in improving the A-TSRM, recording consistently good test-set values comparable to corruption training. However, as previously mentioned, PGD incurs a large cost in computational time, due to the gradient step computations and the relatively slow training (with respect to epochs) due to the harder computational task of improving adversarial accuracy. Thus, if we are concerned with optimizing the A-TSRM metric, corruption training is an efficient and effective training scheme, while adversarial methods can also be effective but may be much slower.
Tailored Loss Functions
In risk frameworks, we often wish to tailor the loss function φ to better represent a particular problem.
In particular, the cost associated with misclassifications may vary for different true labels and different predictions. For example, a self-driving car predicting the road is clear when there is actually a pedestrian will be far more damaging than predicting there is a pedestrian when the road is clear. The SRR can be particularly useful in such situations, as networks need to be robust to noise in their inputs to fully incorporate all uncertainty present in the decision making process.
To provide a concrete example, we consider training and evaluating using a weighted cross entropy loss
where the weights w(Y ) reflect the relative importance of making accurate positions for different values of the true label Y . For example, by taking w(Y * ) >> 1 for a particular problem class Y * and w(Y ) = 1 for others, the classifier will be heavily penalized if it fails to correct identify with high-confidence all occurrences of Y * . In turn, this heavy penalty can increase the sensitivity to perturbations in the inputs: we do not want our classifier to confidently predict that Y = Y * if our input is close to points for which Y = Y * , as this risks incurring the heavy penalty if our inputs are noisy or our classifier is imperfect.
To assess the efficacy of SRR compared with natural risk in this setting, we consider training on MNIST using the same architecture as in Experiment 6.1, but with a weighted CE loss where w(8) = 100 and w(Y ) = 1 otherwise, i.e. penalizing classifiers which fail to confidently identify images of the figure 8. We also change the perturbation distribution from those used earlier, taking p(X |X) ∼ N (X, σ 2 I) with σ = 0.3.
The results, shown in Figure 2, trained network is far lower than the final test natural risk on the natural risk trained network, a powerful result given that the former is a corrupted version of the latter. Moreover, evaluating the corruption trained network, we achieve lower SRR risk (top right) than natural risk (top left). Thus even when the inputs are not corrupted, we can achieve better weighted cross entropy loss by artificially adding noise to both the training procedure and at test-time. This indicates that for the weighted-cross entropy loss, the SRR can provide robustness not only by accounting for potential input noise but also by better accounting for the imperfect nature of the network to avoid overconfidently dismissing the potential for a test-time datapoint to belong to the problem class.
CONCLUSIONS
Motivated by applications where test-time corruptions are not generated adversarially but probabilistically, we introduced a statistically robust risk (SRR) frame-work, providing a class of metrics for evaluating robust performance under probabilistic input perturbations that are amenable to efficient training. We showed that the SRR can differ significantly from both natural and adversarial risk, and that networks with low test-time SRRs can be achieved through training with corrupted inputs. Unlike adversarial risk, our results suggest statistically robust risk generalizes from the training data similarly to, and potentially even better than, natural risk, meaning that it has more general practical applicability to high-dimensional datasets and complex architectures. Thus, for probabilistic corruption threat settings, robust neural networks may be within reach for a wide range of applications by using SRRs.
